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NOTES
Innocence by Association: Entities and the
Person-Enterprise Rule Under RICO
Section 1962 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO),' prohibits a "person" from investing in, acquiring, or
operating an "enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 2
Widely acknowledged as one of the broadest federal statutes,3  nany
courts have attempted to limit its scope. Notably, those restrictive judi-
cial interpretations that have reached the Supreme Court have been
struck down.4 Nevertheless, a majority of lower courts continues to de-
velop and apply a doctrine that either partially or completely precludes
entity liability5 under RICO.
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). In full, section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title
18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or
the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or oper-
ation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of invest-
ment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer,
or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities
of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after
such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of sub-
sections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
3 See, e.g., Strasser, Prosecutors, Private Bar Find New Uses for RICO, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at
18, col. 1 (RICO "a bit like the atomic bomb").
4 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (criminal convictions for predicate
acts must precede private civil suit for RICO violation; plaintiff must allege "racketeering injury"
somehow distinct from that directly caused by predicate acts), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United
States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980) (RICO "enterprise" does not include individuals
who engage exclusively in criminal activity), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). See also Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (RICO is purposefully broad); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assoc., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987) (4-year federal Clayton Act statute of limitations applies to
RICO); Shearson-American-Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (civil RICO claims are
arbitrable).
5 In this note, "entity" liability refers to the liability of corporations, partnerships, or other
associations of individuals recognized as distinct juristic persons. See infra note 26. Entity liability is
thus distinguishable from the "personal" liability of partners, shareholders, officers, associates or
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Referred to by this note as "the person-enterprise rule," the doc-
trine prohibits the same entity from being both the "person" and the
"enterprise" in the same count of a complaint or indictment. 6 Courts
normally apply the rule only to claims under section 1962(c). 7 For exam-
ple, under the rule a corporation may not be a "person" that can conduct
itself unlawfully as an "enterprise." Thus, in the majority of circuits, the
rule may immunize corporations in many situations from liability for vio-
lations of section 1962(c). 8 Courts applying the person-enterprise rule
to any or all of the other three subsections of section 1962 have reached
inconsistent results. 9
The thesis of this note is that the person-enterprise rule should be
abandoned, and that courts should instead apply established criminal law
principles to determine an entity's liability under RICO. After an over-
view of RICO in Part I, Part II reviews general liability principles of the
civil and criminal law. Part III examines RICO in light of these general
principles, and suggests that courts should apply criminal standards of
entity liability to RICO cases. Part IV summarizes the case law regarding
the liability of artificial entities under RICO. Part V critiques the founda-
tion and consequences of the majority approach. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes that traditional criminal law principles of entity liability are fully
consistent with the policies behind both RICO and the person-enterprise
rule.
I. Congressionally Enacted Organized Crime Laws
Finding that "organized crime in the United States is a highly so-
phisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains bil-
lions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the
illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption," 10 Congress enacted RICO as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.11 The Act's stated pur-
otherwise classified individual human beings. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.10 (2d ed. 1986) ("enterprise liability").
6 See infra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 162-197 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 117-130, 162-197 and accompanying text.
10 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)
(Finding (1)). Other findings:
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from
such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of prop-
erty, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other
forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors, and competing organizations, interfere
with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the do-
mestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) or-
ganized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of
the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
11 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)). RICO is not,
however, limited to organized crime in its stereotypical sense. See infra note 20; Abrams, The Place of
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pose is to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies."' 12 Purposefully broad in order to combat the
realities of organized crime,' 3 RICO provides enhanced criminal penal-
ties' 4 and civil sanctions 5 for those "persons"' 16 that acquire or operate
an "enterprise" 1 7 "through" a "pattern" 18 of "racketeering activity"1 9 -
Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be Sued- Lessons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil RICO
and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1477, 1517 (1985). See also Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in
Statutes and Law Enforcement Administration, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 511 (1986)
("No generally applicable legal definition of concepts of 'organized crime,' ... has been crafted or
accepted.").
12 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L: No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
13 Congress expressly provided that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). The legislative history indicates Congressional awareness of
RICO's broad scope. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4032 ("Subsection [1961](4) defines 'enterprise' to include as-
sociations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative entities. Thus, infiltration of any associated
group by any individual or group capable of holding a property interest'can be reached.") (emphasis added). See
also id at 4033 (explaining prohibited activities):
Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at stopping the infiltration of
racketeers into legitimate organizations.
Subsection(a) makes it unlawful to invest funds derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity, as defined in section 1961 (1) and (5), or collection of an unlawful debt as defined in
section 1961(6), in any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The funds
must have been derived by the investing party from activity in which he particpated as a
principal. An exception has been provided for the purchase on the open market of less than
I percent of a company's securities where there is no degree of control in law or in fact to
the investor.
Subsection (b) prohibits acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise through the pro-
scribed pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. There is no 1 percent
limitation here as in subsection (a) because (a) focuses on legitimate acquisition with illegiti-
mate funds. Subsection (b) focuses on illegitimate acquisition with illegitimate funds. Subsec-
tion (b) focuses on illegitimate acquisition through the proscribed pattern of activity or
collection of debt. Consequently, any acquisition meeting the test of subsection (b) is prohibited
without exception.
Subsection (c) prohibits the conduct of the enterprise through the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity through the prohibited pattern of racketeering activity or collection of debt.
Again, the prohibition is without exception.
Subsection (d) makes conspiracy to violate (a), (b), or (c) equally subject to the sanc-
tions of sections 1963 and 1964 ....
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has followed the Congressional directive to construe RICO broadly. See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., A73 U.S. 479, 497 (1985); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
586-87 (1981). "The story of RICO is a good story, which deserves telling for its own sake." Lynch,
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 664 (1987). For extensive
but dissimilar discussions of the "story of RICO," Compare id at 664-685 with Blakey, The RICO Civil
Fraud Action in Context.Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-280 (1982).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). RICO's criminal penalties include a fine of up to $25,000, imprison-
ment of up to 20 years, or both, and of forfeiture of any interest acquired or maintained in violating
the statute.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). RICO's civil remedies include divestment from any interest in any
enterprise, restrictions on activities or investments, dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
and treble damages.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) provides: "'person' includes any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
17 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) provides: "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."
18 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides:
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in short, for those who engage in "organized crime" in its generic, rather
than stereotypical sense. 20
II. Generally Accepted Accountability Principles
Any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial inter-
est in property may sue or be sued for a RICO violation. 21 In violating
any statute, an individual may act alone, in concert with others, or
through employees and agents. An artificial entity, by contrast, is incapa-
ble of acting at all except through employees and agents. 22 The civil and
criminal law provide similar but distinct rationales for attributing the
"'pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity.
See Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime? 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526,
535 n.37 (1987); Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 92
(1986). As of this writing, the United States Supreme Court is about to consider the meaning of
"pattern." HJ. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W.
3638 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1988) (No. 87-1252).
19 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides:
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United
States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sec-
tions 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from in-
terstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating
to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to credit trans-
actions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341
(relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to ob-
struction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), sec-
tion 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia,
section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportaion of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations) or section 501 (c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, sell-
ing, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of
the United States
20 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (" '[Any person,' not just mobsters.")
Id. at 494. ("[L]egitimate ... enterprises . . . enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal
activity nor immunity from its consequences.") Id. at 499. See also United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 590-91 (1981) ("major purpose of... [RICO was] to address the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime... [but] unpersuaded that Congress ... confined ... RICO [to] only
infiltration of legitimate business.") (emphasis in original); Twenty seven states have enacted "little
RICO" statutes of their own, twenty-one of which include multiple-damage private claims for relief.
Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 596 (statutes collected). These state RICO laws, too, are not
limited to organized crime. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Federal and Colorado RICO not limited to organized crime); Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador,
464 So. 2d 265, 268-69 (Fla. App. 1985) (Florida RICO not limited to organized crime).
21 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
22 N. Y. Central & H. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-93 (1909).
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conduct of individuals to themselves, to other individuals, or to artificial
entities.
This section seeks to provide a brief review of general principles of
civil and criminal liability. Commentators critical of the majority's ap-
proach to entity liability under RICO have suggested that judges have
failed to adequately consider the potential interplay between some of the
law's common liability distinctions and RICO's specific liability require-
ments. The difference between civil and criminal liability is among the
allegedly ignored distinctions.23 Others include the difference between
individual and entity liability, 24 and the difference between direct and vi-
carious liability.25 This section will highlight these distinctions. In its
examination of RICO, Part III will attempt to evaluate the merits of the
distinctions, and to suggest an application of the doctrines to RICO
cases.
A. General Rules of Civil Liability
Grounded in the law of torts, the civil law seeks to resolve conflicts
between persons 26 arising out of "all the things that constitute modem
living." 27 Tort law defines the duties and responsibilities of persons with
respect to each other in civil society, and adjusts between the parties to a
civil suit for the losses incurred and injuries suffered as a result of the
breach of such duties. 28 These responsibilities, absolute rather than con-
tractual in nature,29 have been extended to commercial30 as well as eve-
ryday activities.
23 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 582 n.235 (1987) (favoring application of criminal re-
spondeat superior and agency principles); Note,Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO
and the Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 BOSTON U. L. REV. 561, 600 (1985) [hereinafter
Judicial Efforts] (noting a distinction between corporate liability for torts and crimes).
24 See Dwyer & Kiely, Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 324, 330 (1985) (recognizing "a corporation can act only through natural
persons"); Judicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 600 (recognizing "A corporation is an artificial entity
which acts through its board of directors, its officers, and its employees."); Blakey, supra note 13, at
294 (recognizing "The legal rules for determinining the criminal responsibility of entities parallel
those applicable to individuals.")
25 SeeJudicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 606 (noting distinction between direct and vicarious corpo-
rate liability); Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 24, at 325-327 (distinguishing direct and vicarious claims);
2 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) 1, at 1, 2 and 5 n.8 (May 5, 1987) (categorizing claims as direct and
vicarious).
26 No less than seven theories ofjuristic personality exist. IV R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 222 n.1,
260-261 (1959). Although legal personality was once confined to individual human beings, see id. at
192, the law today recognizes various artificial entities as "persons." Compare United States v. A-P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958) (partnership is a "person" for purposes of criminal liability) with
United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965) (unincorporated association not
person for purpose of diversity jurisdiction).
27 W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, TORTS § I at 6 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting Wright, Introduction to the
Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 238 (1944))
28 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, § 1.
29 Id
30 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 etseq., (antitrust); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b etseq., 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a
et seq. (securities).
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1. Individuals
Individuals may incur civil liability solely by themselves, jointly with
others, or vicariously through agents. 3 I In assessing whether to hold in-
dividuals liable for their own actions, the focus of tort law is on the intent
or negligence of the wrongdoer.3 2 'Nevertheless, certain activities may
result in strict liability. 33
In order to be found jointly liable, multiple tortfeasors must all act
with the requisite intent or negligence 3 4 An express agreement among
joint tortfeasors is not necessary; a "tacit understanding" suffices.35
However, an agreement to commit a wrongful act, by itself, is never a
tort.
3 6
As employers or principals, individuals can incur vicarious civil lia-
bility for the torts of their employees or agents. As an employer, an indi-
vidual is liable for the torts employees commit within "the scope of their
employment."37 Known generally as respondeat superior,38 such deriva-
tive liability is currently characterized as "a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of risk."3 9 As a principal, an individual may be liable under
agency theories that the individual actually authorized, 40 apparently au-
thorized, 4' or subsequently ratified 42 the agent's conduct. Similarly, as a
member of a "joint enterprise," an individual may be held vicariously
liable for the torts fellow members commit within the scope of the enter-
prise.43 Vicarious liability may attach for both intentional44 and negli-
gent 4 5 conduct.
31 See generally, W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27.
32 Id. §6at30.
33 Id. § 75 at 536. ("There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on neither
side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss and hence to shift
the loss by creating liability where there has been no fault.") See also Pound, The End of Law as Devel-
oped in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REv. 195, 233 (1914).
34 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, at 324.
35 Id. at 323.
36 Id. at 324. Such an agreement may constitute conspiracy in the criminal context. Id See also
infra note 62. While the "gist" of criminal responsibility is "conspiracy," Ianelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975), it is an overt act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy from which
damages flow that forms the basis of civil responsibility for conspiracy. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971); Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913); Kamm, Inc. v.
Flink, 113 NJ. 502, 588-89, 175 A. 62, 68-69 (1934).
37 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-237 (1958) (Scope of employment).
38 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, at 500.
39 Id. at 500.
40 Id. at 499. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 215 (1958) (Conduct authorized but
unintended by principal).
41 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, at 499. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 216 (1958) (Unauthorized tortious conduct).
42 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, at 499. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 218 (1958) (Effect of Ratification).
43 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, § 72.
44 Id. § 70 at 505. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1958) (Use of Force).
45 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 70.
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2. Entities
Unlike a human individual, an artificial entity can act only through its
employees and agents. 46 Accordingly, the rules governing the derivative
liability of individuals determine the liability of entities. Thus, a corpora-
tion may incur liability under theories of r.espondeat superior, authority,
or ratification. 47 With apparent authority, the corporate principal may
be civilly liable even though the agent did not act in order to benefit the
corporation. 48  Partnerships are treated analogously to joint
enterprises. 49
Voluntary associations, as distinguished from corporations and part-
nerships, typically organize for religious, charitable, or other public
causes.50 Such groups are incapable of holding any legal or beneficial
interest in property unless a statute provides otherwise. 51 Where stat-
utes apply, the laws are often unclear as to the potential civil liabilities of
associations and their members. 52
B. GeneralRules of Criminal Liability
Crimes, unlike torts, are offenses against society as a whole rather
than specific persons. 53 Of course, the same act may be both a tort and a
crime. 54 Unlike the civil law, however, the criminal law exists not to ad-
just losses or compensate injuries, but rather to punish, deter, incapaci-
tate, or reform the wrongdoer.55
46 See Philadelphia W. and B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 210 (1858) ("To enable
impersonal human beings - mere legal entities, which exist only in contemplation of law - to
perform corporeal acts.. . the principle of representation has been adopted.")
47 See, e.g., Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604, 645 (1870) (actual authority
unnecessary, apparent authority sufficient); Philadelphia and Reading R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 468, 486 (1852) (actual authority unnecessary, scope of employment determinative).
The rule of"respondeat superior," or that the master shall be civilly liable for the
tortious acts of his servant, is of universal application, whether the act be one of omission or
commission, whether negligent, fraudulent or deceitful. If it is done in the course of his
employment, the master is liable; and it makes no difference that the master did not author-
ize, or even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved or forbade it, he
is equally liable, if the act be done in the course of his servant's employment.
Ia
48 American Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1982) (antitrust)
(apparent authority theory settled rule in federal system).
49 "Each partner [is] the agent and representative of the firm with reference to all business
within the scope of the partnership." Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 561 (1885) (fraud); see also
Castle v. Bullard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 172, 188-189 (1859) (fraud).
50 E. LATrv & G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS 428-430 (1963).
51 Cf Trustee of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 27-28
(1819) (Marshall, CJ.) ("It was obviously the intention of the testator that the Association should
take in its character as an Association... but not being incorporated, [it] is incapable of taking... as
a society."); Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 368 (1879) ("We do not overlook the fact that there are
cases in which charitable uses have been sustained... but in them all the decisions have rested upon
statutes of the state enacted to provide for special cases.").
52 E. LATr & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 50, at 428-430.
53 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, § 2.
54 Id at 8.
55 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, § 1.5.
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1. Individuals
As in the civil context, an individual may incur direct or vicarious
criminal liability. Unlike tort liability however, criminal guilt requires a
forbidden act (actus reus) coupled with a culpable state of mind (mens
rea).56 An individual may be criminally liable for the acts of another as an
aider-and-abettor or co-conspirator. The criminal forms of vicarious lia-
bility have their own actus reus and mens rea requirements. 57 In addition to
complicity and conspiracy, courts have held persons without criminal
fault of their own liable for the unlawful conduct of others. 58 However,
56 Id., § 1.2 at 7, § 3.1; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) ("an evil-meaning
mind with an evil-doing hand"). The act may be one of omission or commission. W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoRr, supra note 5, §§ 3.2-3.3. Like the prohibited conduct, the required state of mind is generally
determined by statute. Id., § 3.4 at 213. Courts infer a state of mind requirement for common law
crimes. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-263. Where no state of mind requirement appears in the
statute, courts may impose strict liability for "regulatory" or "public welfare" offenses. See., e.g.,
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-254 (1922) (interpreting Narcotic Act § 2, 38 Stat. 785,
786 (1914)) ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty
against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to damage from the drug, and concluded that the
latter was the result preferably to be avoided."). -
57 Complicity is the facilitation of criminal conduct. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 5, §§ 6.6-6.8. Only knowledge of the activity itself, not of its criminal character, is required. Id.
at 581 ("Such is not the case, for here as well the general principle that ignorance of the law is no
excuse prevails."). Conspiracy is the agreement to commit crime. See generally id., §§ 6.4, 6.5. An
overt act may be required in addition to the agreement itself. The general federal conspiracy statute,
quoted below, requires an overt act. Most states also require an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Id. at 548.
The general federal complicity statute provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or an-
other would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (Principals).
The general federal conspiracy statute provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum pun-
ishment provide for such misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (Conspiracy).
Courts are divided as to the appropriate state of mind under the general complicity and conspir-
acy statutes. Compare United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (requiring an interest
for complicity) and United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) (requiring an interest
in conspiracy), a]J'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) with Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635,
637 (4th Cir. 1940) (requiring only knowledge for complicity) and Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d
581, 587 (4th Cir. 1955) (requiring only knowledge of conspiracy), rev'd on other grounds, 367 U.S. 203
(1961). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, § 6.7 at 579-587 (noting "considerable
confusion" regarding required mental state for complicity); id., § 6.4 at 535-542 (noting "considera-
ble confusion" regarding required mental state for conspiracy).
58 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 5, § 3.8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa.
575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959) (licensee and operator of tavern liable for acts of employees in serving
liquor to unsupervised minors; criminal fine upheld, prison sentence overturned). See generally
Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984). See also G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAw 647-649 (1978) ("This form of liability relates to complicity as strict liability relates to
the principle of culpability.")
Conspiracy and complicity related doctrines also allow for criminal liability that is both strict
and vicarious. A person will be liable for foreseeable acts committed in furtherance of the conspir-
acy by a co-conspirator. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645 (1946). See also W. CLARK &
W. MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 552 (7th ed. 1967) ("The combinatorial characteris-
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the law excepts victims of criminal activity from criminal liability even
though they may have in fact engaged in conduct that otherwise aided
and abetted the commission of the crime.59
2. Entities
Incapable of thought or action'without their employees and agents,
artificial entities engaging in criminal conduct do not conform easily to
the actus reus/mens rea model of individual criminal accountability. 60 Early
common law held corporations incapable of mens rea, and therefore inca-
pable of criminal activity. 1  Today, however, rules governing corporate
criminal liability resemble those governing individual criminal liability.
Generally, a corporation may be liable for the illegal activities of its
employees or agents if they acted (1) within the scope of their employ-
ment or agency and (2) with the intent to benefit the corporation.6 2 Lia-
tic of conspiracy places liability on a dragnet plane, for a co-conspirator's liability flows from his
membership in the conspiracy, rather than physical participation.").
59 Gelbardi v. United States, 387 U.S. 112 (1933) (following Queen v. Tyrell, I Q.B. 710
(1894)); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1275-1279 (4th Cir. 1986); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 5, at 595.
60 See generally Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 393 (1982); Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick An Unscandalized Inquiy into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Orland, Relfections on Corporate Crime: Law in
Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501 (1980); Developments in the Law - Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
61 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476.
62 Finding "no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy," the Supreme Court
extended respondeat superior into the criminal realm for corporations in New York Central & H.
R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,494-99 (1909). The court in New York Central appeared to under-
stand the requirement as part of the tort doctrine. See id at 493. More recently, however, American
Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1982). suggests that intent to bene-
fit is not necessary when the agent has apparent authority. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 219(d), 248-249, 261-62 (1958). Nevertheless, the requirement remains "universally ac-
cepted" in federal criminal cases. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 5, at 262; 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPO-
RATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 84 (1984) (intent to benefit requirement is properly understood "as a rule
of general application and acceptance"). See generally Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360
Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971) (containing an extensive discussion of the development and appli-
cation of corporate criminal liability principles); K. BRICKEY, supra, § 4:02 (discussing the intent to
benefit requirement).
The intent to benefit rule serves to prevent successful prosecution of a corporation that is
the victim rather than a mere vehicle for criminal conduct, by requiring that the wrongdo-
ing agent must act with some purpose of forwarding corporate business. But the corpora-
tion need not receive actual benefit from the wrongdoing or even be the intended
beneficiary of the misconduct itself before the entity will be held accountable. The agent's
conduct may, indeed, be detrimental to the interests of the corporation. As long as the
corporation is not the object of the crime- as opposed to a convenient vehicle for its per-
petration- the intent to benefit rule will not preclude conviction of the corporate entity.
Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 134-35
(1984) (footnotes omitted).
[E]xcept where the law defining the offense specifically provides otherwise, the conduct
giving rise to corporate liability must be "performed by an agent of the corporation acting
in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment." However, this
does not mean that a corporation can escape liability merely by contending that criminal
acts are "ultra vires" (beyond the power of the corporation, as defined by its charter or act
of incorporation), that the agents were not expressly authorized, or that the agent acted
contrary to instructions. The criminal act must be directly related to the performance of the
duties which the officer or agent has the broad authority to perform, and must be done with
the "intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is
employed." It is not necessary that the criminal acts actually benefit the corporation, but an
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bility may also result from a corporate duty owed to the public.63 Similar
rules apply to partnerships 64 and voluntary assocations. 65 Entity criminal
liability neither precludes66 nor depends upon 67 a finding of individual
responsibility.
III. RICO Adapted Accountability Principles
Because of its broad scope, RICO can easily become a quagmire for
the distinctions among conventional theories of liability. Although
RICO is codified as part of the criminal code, the statute authorizes both
civil remedies and criminal sanctions for the criminal conduct it pros-
agent's acts are not "in behalf of the corporation" if undertaken solely to advance the
agent's own interests or interests of parties other than the corporate employer.
W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 5, at 262 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. Harry L.
Young & Sons, 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d
570, 573 (4th Cir.) ("[A] corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations
committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent au-
thority, and for the benefit of the corporation even if... such acts were against corporate policy or
express instructions."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); United States v. Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985) ("We believe that Basic Construction states a gener-
ally applicable rule on corporate criminal liability despite the fact that it addresses violations of the
antitrust laws."); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 823 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("To be acting within his
employment, the agent must first have intended that his act would have produced some benefit to
the corporation or some benefit to himself and the corporation second."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217
(1985); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Generally, a corporation
is responsible for the criminal acts of its officers, agents, and employees committed within the scope
of their employment and for the benefit of the corporation."); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d
238, 241-242 (1st Cir.) (agent must be "performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to per-
form, and those acts must be motivated- at least in part- by an intent to benefit the corporation"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982). See also R. POUND, LAW AND MoRALs 76-77 (1926). Perhaps antici-
pating RICO, Pound wrote:
[RIespondeat superior is not a universal moral rule [footnote omitted]. The shifting of the
burden to the employer, no matter how careful he has been and how free from fault, pro-
ceeds on the social interest in the general security, which is maintained best by holding
those who conduct enterprises in which others are employed to an absolute liability for
what their servants do in the course of the enterprise.
Id. (emphasis in original).
A different rule of corporate liability is the so-called "superior agent rule." W. LAFAVE & A.
Sco-rr, supra note 5, at 259-262. Under this rule, a corporation may be liable only if a high manage-
rial agent committed or ratified the unlawful conduct. This concept of corporate criminal liability is
reflected in the Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1)(c) (1962), and it has been adopted
by statute in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-606 (1986) ("high managerial
agent"); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-803 (1988) ("managerial official"). The superior agent rule is not,
however, the federal standard. Nor does it appear to be the general rule in any sense. K. BICKEY,
supra, §§ 3:03, 3:04; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, at 262.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 244 (1938) ("The duty (not to
confine cattle in freight cars for more than 28 hours without unloading for rest, water and feed-
ing]... did not arise out of the relation of employer and employee but was one that, in virtue of the
statute, was owed by respondent to the shippers and the public."); see also K. BRICKEY, supra note 62,
§ 2:07 ("The law of nuisance provided the earliest weapon in the arsenal of theories that would
support a criminal prosecution.").
64 See United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125-127 (1958); Gordon v. United
States, 347 U.S. 909 (1954). Unlike in the civil context, however, the knowledge of one partner will
not be imputed to another. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 408, 411 (1962).
65 United States v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381, 389-90 (1913) (joint stock companies).
66 See Gordon, 347 U.S. at 910.
67 See K. BRICKEY, supra note 62, § 3:08 (Corporate Liability for Acts of Acquitted Agents).
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NOTES
cribes. 68 In addition to RICO's perplexing dual character, courts must
also deal with the statute's broad language and interrelated provisions.
A. The Statutory Distinction Between a "Person" and an "Enterprise"
RICO prohibits "persons," not "enterprises" from engaging in the
conduct it proscribes. The "enterprise" is properly regarded as an ele-
ment of a RICO offense, not a party to the litigation. 69 Corporations
satisfy both the RICO definition of "person" and "enterprise. ' 70 Thus, a
corporation may be both a defendant and an element of a RICO offense.
To violate RICO as a "person" (defendant), a corporation must neces-
sarily act through its employees or agents. To qualify as an element of a
"person's" RICO violation (enterprise), the corporation need only exist
as a legally recognized artificial entity.71
1. Relevance of the Distinction Between Individual
and Entity Liability
Understanding the difference between individual and entity liability
further clarifies the distinction between the RICO definitions of "per-
son" and "enterprise." Significantly, the definition of "enterprise" ex-
pressly includes associations in fact, but the definition of "person" does
not.72 As part of its scheme to eliminate organized crime, RICO targets
the proceeds of such activity. 73 Because an association in fact is incapa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, it is incapable of
retaining the tangible benefits of racketeering in its own right.7 4 Such
property must necessarily be held by the members of the association,
who are capable of maintaining a legal or beneficial interest in property.
Each member of an association in fact thus qualifies as a "person," and
may be liable under RICO-just like any other member of a joint enter-
prise, partner, co-conspirator, or accomplice. Therefore, the entire asset
pool of an association in fact "enterprise" is within RICO's purview even
though such associations themselves do not qualify as "persons. '75
68 See supra notes 14-15.
69 This element, when it is, for example, an association in fact "is proved by evidence of an
ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
70 See supra notes 16-17.
71 See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11 th Cir. 1982) (quoted infra at text accompa-
nying note 134), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). Even assuming, arguendo, that corporations had
to meet Turkette's "enterpris.e' requirements, they would appear to do so automatically. See infra
note 186. See also United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981).
72 See supra notes 16-17.
73 See supra note 13.
74 See supra note 51.
75 The notion that an association in fact may not legally hold property in a way distinct from the
personal holdings of its members underpins the rationale of the person-enterprise rule. See Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We doubt
that an 'association in fact' can, as such, hold any interest in property or even be brought into
court."), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). The assumption is accepted here to suggest how
it might tend to support rejection of the rule.
In fact, however, there may he such a thing as "association property" distinct from the personal
holdings of members of the association. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141-43 (N.D.
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A corporation or other legal "person," by contrast, is capable of
holding property in its own right. 76 Of course, employees of corpora-
tions, like members of an association in fact, may be liable as RICO "per-
sons." However, the assets of a corporate enterprise - which may have
been increased or decreased as a result of racketeering - remain distinct
from the personal assets of the employees. Because corporations can act
only through their employees, corporate assets would remain outside
RICO's purview unless the corporation itself could also be named as the
"person," or unless the corporation could be otherwise held vicariously
liable for the actions of its employees.
A RICO violation by a corporate employee thus sets the stage for the
potential interplay between RICO's statutory requirements and common
law liability principles. This interplay may occur in two pleading situa-
tions. Initially, a plaintiff (or prosecutor) may plead that the corporation
was the "person" that violated RICO through its employee. Under this
first pleading option, the liability sought is said to be "direct" from the
corporation.77 Alternately, the plaintiff may plead that the employee was
the "person" who violated RICO, and that the corporation is liable for its
employee's violation. Under this second pleading option, the liability
sought is said to be "vicarious. '" 7 8 In both counts, the plaintiff names the
corporation as the "enterprise" that was illegally invested in, acquired,
or operated.
2. Irrelevance of the Distinction Between Direct
and Vicarious Liability
The "direct"/"vicarious" terminology accurately categorizes poten-
tial forms of individual liability. 79 However, this terminology does not
accurately describe corporate liability, given the difference between the
actions of individuals and those of artificial entities. Individuals may take
action by themselves or through agents.8 0 Unlike individuals, however,
corporations can act only through their agents. Thus, all corporate lia-
bility is vicarious liability.8' Both of the above pleading options present
the question whether the actions of the employee are fairly attributable
to the corporate principal.8 2
Ga. 1979), afd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982). The significance of this
apparent split in authority is considered in Part V. See infra note 184.
76 See generally, H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 79 (1983).
77 See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29-32 (1st Cir. 1986).
78 See id.
79 The common law contained a similar vocabulary. A principal in the first degree was the indi-
vidual who actually engaged in the criminal conduct. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, at § 66. A
principal in the second degree (a.k.a "aider and abetter," see id., § 33 at 571) was one actually or
constructively "present" at the scene of the crime and who helped the principal in the first degree
commit the crime. Id. at 497-98.
80 See supra notes 31-45, 56-59.
81 Because corporations can act only through their employees and agents, corporate liability is
perhaps best thought of as "aform of vicarious liability." T. GARDINER & V. MANIAN, CRIMINAL LAW
110 (1980) (emphasis added).
82 Whether the liability sought is "direct" or "vicarious," "there still arise significant questions
concerning those acts which may be attributed to the corporation." Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 24, at
327.
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B. The RICO Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Liability
Established civil and criminal agency principles each offer possible
answers to this question of accountability. Absent a clear indication to
the contrary, normal rules of agency apply to a federal statute.8 3 How-
ever, because RICO is both civil and criminal, it is not obvious whether
normal criminal or normal civil rules should apply.
1. Relevance of the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Liability
Understanding the difference between civil and criminal liability fa-
cilitates the choice between the two. RICO's purpose is to eradicate
crime, not merely to compensate victims.8 4 Accordingly, the criminal
standards of entity liability are preferable to those of the civil law. Nota-
bly RICO is codified 85 as part of'the criminal code, which contains ex-
press provisions for aiding and abetting8 6 and conspiracy.87
2. Appropriateness of Criminal Rules for Civil RICO: Section 1964
RICO section 1961(3) indicates that "person" includes any individ-
ual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in prop-
erty.8 8 "Person" not only describes the potential RICO civil defendant,
but the plaintiff as well. Section 1964(c) states that "any person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962...
may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."8 9
The statutory treble damages RICO provides serve both civil (com-
pensatory) and criminal (deterrent) purposes, as does RICO itself.90 In-
asmuch as treble damages provide compensation for any "accumulative
83 See, e.g., American Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 569 (1982) (normal rules
of agency apply to antitrust laws).
84 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
85 Codification is meant to accomplish three objectives: "(1) collate the original law with all
subsequently passed amendments by taking into consideration the deletion or addition of language
changed by the amendments; (2) bring all laws on the same subject or topic together; and (3) elimi-
nate all repealed, superseded, or expired laws." J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 143 (1987). Certain titles of the United States Code have been codified by the
Office of Law Revision Counsel and enacted by Congress into positive law. Id. at 145. These titles
represent "a complete compilation, restatement, and revision of the general and permanent laws of
the United States . 1..." I U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982). Those titles which have not been enacted into
positive law are prima facie evidence of the law. The wording found in the Statutes at Large takes
priority over that found in a nonenacted Code title. Id at 145-46. See also M. COHEN & R. BERRING,
How TO FIND THE LAW 191-94 (8th ed. 1983).
Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), containing RICO, is an example of a title which has
been codified and enacted by Congress into positive law. Title 15 (Commerce and Trade), contain-
ing the antitrust and securities laws, is an example of a title which has not been enacted into positive
law. Because Title 18, unlike Title 15, contains express general provisions for aiding and abetting
and conspiracy liability, arguments that these criminal forms of derivative liability do not lie under
RICO appear out of place.
86 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See supra note 57 for full text.
87 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). See supra note 57 for full text.
88 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
90 Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526,
527-528 (1986).
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harm," they enhance the established remedial purposes of the civil law.9 1
Insofar as treble damages exceed such real damages, however, they also
enhance available criminal sanctions which punish the wrongdoer and
deter others.92
Because RICO's damage provisions contain a punitive or deterrent
component, it seems appropriate to require a showing of entity culpabil-
ity (intent to benefit) and to reject strict liability (no intent to benefit).
The criminal law's traditional insistence upon an intent to benefit the
entity tempers the loss adjusting purposes of vicarious civil liability with
the fault-based principles of general criminal liability. An intent to bene-
fit approach to entity liability under RICO appears well suited to the dual
character of RICO in general and of statutory treble damages in particu-
lar. The approach makes RICO's enhanced recovery available based
only upon an enhanced showing, i.e., a showing including an intent to
benefit the entity that is in accord with established corporate liability
principles. The criminal law's traditional protection of victims from lia-
bility is a related safeguard against a harsh result. Generally however,
courts have been reluctant to hold traditionally legitimate corporations
liable for RICO violations under any theory of liability.93
3. Status of Criminal Rules Under Criminal RICO: Section 1963
RICO itself does not define its potential criminal defendant, "who-
ever." 94 The definition is found in the general rules of construction for
all federal statutes. 95 The primary distinction between RICO's civil and
criminal defendants is that unlike the civil defendant, the class of criminal
defendants does not include governmental entities that would be "capa-
ble of holding a legal interest." 96 Where the defendant is an entity, fines
and forfeiture are the applicable penalties. 97
91 Id. at 528 & 528 n.13 ("Accumulative harm is that harm falling outside the range of legal
damages, too elusive and indeterminate for adequate measurement by traditional damage
principles.")
Compensatory damages also deter. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 154 (2d
ed. 1977). Indeed, compensatory damages may sometimes produce the amount of deter-
rence necessary to inhibit wrongful conduct. Ia at 143. When they do not, multiple dam-
ages can be used to ensure that the expected benefits discounted by the likelihood of
getting caught will not exceed the anticipated costs, including opportunity costs and poten-
tial liability costs. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 226 (1976).
Id. at 533 n.38.
92 id. at 527-28.
93 See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
95 "[U]nless the context indicates otherwise," the general rules of construction of the United
States Code provide that "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, as-
sociations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals" I U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982). As noted earlier, RICO "indicates otherwise" for the definition of "person." See supra
note 16. RICO does not, however, contain its own definition of "whoever." Notably, governments
fit the RICO description of "person" as potential holders of legal or beneficial interests in property,
but fall outside the 1 U.S.C. § 1 definition of "whoever." See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258,
276 (1946); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941). The use of "whoever" to
describe the criminal RICO defendant and "person" to describe the RICO civil RICO defendant
thus indicates that, while civil RICO liability may extend to governments, criminal liability may not.
96 Compare text of 1 U.S.C. § 1, quoted supra note 95, with text of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), quoted
supra note 16. See supra note 95; Blakey, supra note 13, at 243 n.20.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
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The courts have also been reluctant to impose criminal liability on
traditionally legitimate corporations. 98 Where criminal liability has been
found, the courts have generally failed to articulate the standards of
criminal entity liability under RICO. Usually, employees or agents have
held important positions within the enterprise.99 In addition, most of the
alleged predicate acts have included fraud or bribery to enhance the en-
tity.'0 0 As such, courts have been able to infer "scope of employment"
and "intent to benefit." 10 1
IV. Judicially Inferred Statutory Requirements
The Seventh Circuit's Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers 10 2 is among the most
recent appellate cases dealing with corporate liability under RICO. Liq-
uid Air reflects the majority's reluctance to impose liability in several re-
spects. 10 3 Like the Seventh Circuit, most circuits adhere to the person-
enterprise rule for counts brought under section 1962(c).104 Thus, a cor-
poration may not be liable for employees conducting its affairs through
98 See, e.g., United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1105 (1983); see also K. BRICKEY, supra note 62, at 244 (person-enterprise issue is "most apt to
arise when the enterprise in question is a legitimate business enterprise").
99 See United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (forfeiture assessed against
incorporated contractor), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1578 (1987); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (forfeiture assessed against incorporated pornographic distributor), af'd, 665
F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (international
corporation indicted for fraud).
101 See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (acts imputable to enterprise),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); Alves & Stern, Entity Liability Under RICO, in III MATERALS ON RICO
1859 (G. Blakey, ed. 1980).
102 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987).
103 Liquid Air involved the termination of a compressed gas and compressed gas cylinder distribu-
torship agreement between Liquid Air, a corporation, and D & R Welding Supply Co., a partnership.
Id. at 1300. With the assistance of a Liquid Air employee, the D & R partners falsified shipping
orders to show that several thousand cylinders had been returned in accordance with the agreement.
Id. To reward the Liquid Air employee, the partners set him up with his own welding business,
Bridges Welding Supply & Therapy, a corporation. Id. Although Bridges Welding did not exist
during the scheme, the court concluded that the jury properly inferred its acquiescence in the
wrongdoing. The complaint alleged RICO violations, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. Id
at 1301.
With respect to the RICO violations, Bridges Welding acted as both the "person" and the "en-
terprise." Because Bridges Welding benefitted from the wrongdoing, the court held the corporation
could be vicariously liable for the § 1962(a) and (b) violations of its president, the former Liquid Air
employee. Id. at 1307. (The implications of this apparent "actual benefit" requirement for vicarious
entity liability are discussed infra note 173.) Because of the "person"/"enterprise" identity, such
liability was not possible for § 1962(c) violations. l at 1306. Because it would not affect the dam-
age award, the court declined to reach the issue under § 1962(d). Id at 1307.
104 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, Nos. 86-5135
and 86-5136 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1791); Garbade v. Great
Divide Mining Corp., 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston,
793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986);
Bennet v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1058
(1986); Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984),judgment reentered on remand, 617 F.
Supp. 49 (D.N.J. 1985); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384
(7th Cir. 1984), af'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1984); Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), afd inpart and rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
Only one circuit has expressly taken the contrary position. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d
961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
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racketeering in the majority ofjurisdictions. 10 5 Because corporations can
act only through their employees and agents, the rule effectively immu-
nizes corporations from all liability under this subsection in this factual
setting. Like the Seventh Circuit, however, an increasing number of
courts refuse to apply the person-enterprise rule under section 1962(a)
and recognize derivative liability under that section.10 6 Also like Liquid
Air, relatively few decisions have considered corporate accountability for
employee conspiracies under section 1962(d).10 7 Finally, even where
courts have recognized the availability of derivative liability claims under
RICO, they have often failed to articulate the appropriate standards by
which the RICO violations of racketeer employees or agents may be fairly
attributed to their corporate employers or principals.108
Courts have offered two basic reasons to support the person-enter-
prise rule: (1) the need to respect the "employed by or associated with"
language of section 1962(c), and (2) the desire to protect from RICO
liability corporations that are "innocent victims" or "passive instru-
ments" of racketeering activity.10 9 Although most courts only apply the
person-enterprise rule to section 1962(c),110 some courts have reasoned
that the necessity of a person-enterprise distinction under subsection
1962(c) requires a similarly restrictive construction of subsections
1962(a),"'1 (b),1 12 and (d).113
A. The General Rule (The Judicial Distinction Between a "Person"
and an "Enterprise")
As mentioned above, the person-enterprise rule prohibits naming
the same corporation as both the person and the enterprise within the
105 See infra text accompanying notes 110-35.
106 Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Shreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp.
of Boston, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.
1985).
107 Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986). A number of district courts
have considered the issue. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
108 See Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 24, at 324 (noting "vexing" question whether RICO "contem-
plates true vicarious liability");Judicial Efforts, supa note 23, at 564. (noting "confusion regarding
corporate liability under RICO").
109 See Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank, 747 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1984), discussed infra, text accompanying notes 150-54.
110 See, e.g., United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Management Systems,
Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988) ((c), not (a) or (d); but applies to (d) for conspiracies to violate
(c)); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) ((c), not (a) or (b)); Petro-Tech, Inc.
v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987)((c), not (a)); In re Dow Co. Sarabond Prod. Litig., 666
F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1987) ((c), not (a) or (b)); Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F.
Supp. 948 (D. Del. 1987) ((c), not (a) or (b)); McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va.
1987) ((c)); United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Indus., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ((c)).
111 Entre Computer Centers, Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1987)
(applying person-enterprise rule to § 1962 as a whole); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982) (appearing to apply person-enterprise rule to § 1962 as a whole); H.
J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908 (D. Minn. 1987) (appearing to apply person-
enterprise rule to § 1962 as a whole), afd on other ground, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
56 U.S.L.W. 3638 (U.S. Mar 21, 1988) (No. 87-1252); see also Rush v. Oppenheimer, 628 F. Supp.
1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying person-enterprise rule to both (c) and (a)).
112 Compare cases cited supra note 110 with cases cited supra note 111.
113 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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same count of a complaint or indictment. However, it apparently does
not preclude alleging that a corporation associated as a "person" with an
"enterprise" consisting of itself and other corporations"14 or individu-
als. 1 5 Nor does the rule bar allegations in the alternative where an cor-
poration is named as the enterprise in one count and as the "person" in
another.116
B. The Forbidden "End-runs"
Because a corporation is presumed unable to associate with its em-
ployee or agent under the person-enterprise rule, it may not be named as
a defendant under derivative liability theories for the section 1962(c) vio-
lations of its employees or agents."17 Thus, claims based on respondeat
superior have been disallowed." 8 Because allegations that a corporation
aided and abetted its employee would also permit circumvention of the
rule, courts have likewise held such theories inappropriate."19 Similarly,
courts have foreclosed attempts to characterize the corporation as a
''person" associating with an association in fact "enterprise" comprised
of itself and its employees.' 20 Although some courts have permitted alle-
114 Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.) (corporation may associate as person with other
entities forming enterprise), cert. denied sub nom., Nassau County Republican Comm. v. Cullen, 107 S.
Ct. 3266 (1987); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (corpora-
tion may associate as person with other entities forming enterprise).
115 Connors v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (individuals and firms can
be culpable persons and members of an association in fact enterprise); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (individuals and firms can be culpable persons and
members of an associaton in fact enterprise). Contra Entre Computer Centers, Inc. v.-FMG of Kansas
City, Inc., 819 F.2d 1279, 1287 (4th Cir. 1987) (corporation may not be defendant and part of associ-
ation in fact); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (cor-
poration and unincorporated association not enterprise). The general result may be different when
only the corporation and its employees are involved. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
116 Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987).
117 Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (no aiding and
abetting or vicarious liability for corporation under § 1962(c) where same corporation is both enter-
prise and person).
118 Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (no vicarious liability under
§ 1962(c) where same corporation is both "person" and "enterprise"); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western
Co. of North Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (no vicarious liability for corporation under
§ 1962(c) where same corporation is both "person" and "enterprise"); Schofield v. First Commodity
Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986) (no respondeat superior under § 1962(c) for corpora-
tion where same corporation is both "person" and "enterprise").
119 Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North Am., 824 .F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (no aiding and
abetting liability under § 1962(c) where same corporation is both "person" and "enterprise").
120 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, Nos. 86-5135,
86-5316, slip. op. at 15-17 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1791) (union
local and its trustee may not associate in fact); Robinson v. Kidder Peabody, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 243
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (broker and brokerage may not associate in fact); Hanline v. Sinclair Global Bro-
kerage Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1457 (W.D. Mo.) (broker and brokerage may not associate in fact), appeal
dismissed without opinion, 815 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1987); King v. E. F. Hutton, Civ. A. No. 86-0211
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13082) (broker and brokerage may not
associate in fact); American Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F.
Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill., 1987) (corporation and employee may not associate in fact); Minnesota Odd
Fellows Home Found. v. Engler & Budd Co., 630 F. Supp. 797 (D. Minn. 1986) (corporation and
employee may not associate in fact). See also Prodex, Inc. v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 86-1950 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 866) (broker and brokerage);
Fingar v. Prudential Bache Sec. 662 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (brokerage and parent firm). But
see Petro-Tech, Inc. V. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (corporation
and employees may associate in fact); Gordon v. Tyndall, No. C-86-1397 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1987)
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gations under section 1962(d) that a corporation conspired with its em-
ployees or agents,12' many have dismissed such contentions as attempts
to "end-run" the person-enterprise rule. 122 Courts have also borrowed
reasoning found in antitrust1 23 and civil rights124 cases in support of a
general anti-intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under RICO.1 25
C. The Permitted Alternatives
While denying respondeat superior and aiding and abetting theories
under section 1962(c), courts generally recognize the potential for such
liability under section 1962(a).1 26 That section makes it unlawful for per-
sons involved in racketeering activities as "principals" to receive income
from such activities.1 27 In addition to section 1961(3)'s definition of
"person," the federal criminal code defines "principal" as anyone who
"aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures."128 Because
section 1962(a) does not contain any "employed by or associated with"
language, and because employer corporations can obviously be "princi-
pals" with respect to their racketeer employees, no textual support for
any person-enterprise distinction under section 1962(a) exists. 129 As for
section 1962(b), the lower courts are divided.' 30
(broker and brokerage may associate in fact); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Cal. 1986)
(corporation and employees may associate in fact); Van Dorn Co., Central States Can Co. Div. v.
Howington, 623 F. Supp. 1548 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (corporation and officers may associate in fact);
Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 609 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1985) (corporation and
employees may associate in fact).
121 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Development Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 6746 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,
1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1123); Callan v. State Chemical Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Saine v. AIA, 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 n.9 (D. Colo. 1984); Mauriber v. Shearson-
American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
122 See Village of Fox Lake, Ill. v. Waste Management of Ill., Inc., No. 86 C 4888 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,
1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1593); Prodex, Inc. v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 86-1950 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 866); Onesti v. Thompson
McKinnon Sec., Inc., No. 85 C 4375 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 26, 1987); Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 653 F.
Supp. 1287 (D. V.I. 1987); Gaudette v. Panos, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1987); Lynn Elec. v.
Automation Mach. & Dev. Corp., Civ. A. No. 86-2301 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1986); Leavey v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., Civ. A. No. 85-7108 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1986); Svenningson v. Piper, Jaffray &
Hopwood, Inc., Civ. No. 3-85-921 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 1986); McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group,
Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich 1986); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386 (D. Del. 1986); Medallion T.V. Enter. v. SelecTV
of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986), afdon other grounds, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987);
Fabrico Mfg. Corp. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., No. 85 C 71 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1985) (available on
LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3413); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492
(D.N.J. 1985); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Chambers Dev. Co.
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Yancoski v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 581
F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Homblower & Co., 527 F.
Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich 1981).
123 E.g., Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (no intracorporate con-
spiracy under 15 U.S.C. § I (Sherman Antitrust Act)).
124 E.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (no intracorporate conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
125 See, e.g., Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206
(1981).
126 See cases cited supra note 110.
127 See full statutory text quoted supra note 2.
128 See full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2 quoted supra note 57.
129 Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank, 743 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1984).
130 Compare cases cited supra note 110 with cases cited supra note I11.
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D. The Minority Rule
The only circuit to repudiate the person-enterprise rule did so in a
criminal case. In United States v. Hartley, 131 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "a corporation may be
simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under RICO." 132
The defendants in Hartley were convicted of conspiracy, mail fraud, viola-
tions of the National Stolen Property Act, and section 1962(c) of
RICO.' 33 Upholding the RICO conviction, the court agreed with the
government's contention that "if an individual were named as the enter-
prise, and a group of persons engaged in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity with that individual, it would defy reason to suggest that the central
figure (the enterprise) could not also be prosecuted under RICO."' 3 4
The court addressed the appellant's contention that their conviction ren-
dered the person-enterprise distinction a nullity, and held that proving
the existence of the corporation itself was a "separate and distinct bur-
den," thereby satisfying, the statute's person-enterprise distinction.'3 5
V. Unwittingly Created RICO Immunities
Despite their superficial appeal, neither the textual or policy reasons
offered by the courts that have posited the person-enterprise rule sup-
port the rule. First, it is not at all clear that Congress "contemplated"
the kind of distinction required by the rule in adopting the language of
section 1962(c). Second, although the rule clearly does protect "victim"
enterprises,.it does so because it shields all enterprises- including rack-
eteer influenced and corrupt organizations- from liability under section
1962(c). The consequences of the rule are clearly contrary to the stat-
ute's purposes.
A. Reason by Tautology
The indiscriminate application of the person-enterprise rule appears
to follow logically from the rule's crude beginnings. Indeed, the rule
seems to have preceded its justification.' 36 Stemming from fears of a po-
tential flood of RICO litigation, the rule was adopted quickly by many
jurisdictions, often without analysis.13 7 In Haroco, Inc. v. American National
Bank, 138 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit undertook a textual
131 678 F.2d 961 (llth Cir. 1982).
132 Id at 988.
133 l at 965.
134 Id. at 989. The court also recognized that beneath a corporate exterior can lie "a group of
individuals associated in fact whose common purpose is to engage in racketeering." Id. The Haroco
court found the comparison to an association in fact unpersuasive. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank, 747 F.2d 384,401 (7th Cir. 1984). On the possible similarity or difference between a corpora-
tion and an association in fact, see supra text accompanying notes 72-78; infra text accompanying
notes 184-190 and note 186.
135 678 F.2d at 988.
136 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 583 n.235 ("[Tihe rule... seemed to acquire a life ofits
own, and it swept through the courts of appeal largely without careful or independent analysis of its
rationale or perverse consequences.").
137 See infra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
138 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
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and policy analysis, concluding- without reference to the legislative his-
tory- that the rule reflected Congressional intent. The Haroco opinion
has since been adopted by the overwhelming majority of circuits,1 39 often
with the same paucity of critical review accorded to its less articulate
predecessors. 140
1. The Early Cases
In Van Schaik v. Church of Scientology, 141 the District Court of Massa-
chusetts became the first to declare that "[t]he defendant cannot, at
once, be the associated person and the enterprise."' 142 Briefly reciting
section 1962(c)'s "employed by or associated with" language, the court
concluded "[i]t is only a person, or one associated with an enterprise, not
the enterprise itself who can violate the provisions of the section."143
Later in the opinion, the court expressed concern that "slavish literal-
ism" would "escort into the federal courts through RICO what tradition-
ally have been civil actions pursued in state courts."'144 Similarly, in
United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,145 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit's discussion of the issue consisted of a conclusory state-
ment and a questionable analogy between a corporate agent and a
139 See cases cited supra note 104.
140 See infra note 154.
141 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
142 Id. at 1136.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982).
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human arm.146 The Eighth 147 and Ninth 148 circuits adopted the Computer
Sciences rule without any independent consideration. 149
2. The Leading Case
The first reasoned articulation of the person-enterprise rule came
with the now landmark case of Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank. 150
Not the least ofJudge Cudahy's contributions in Haroco was the observa-
tion that "[d]iscussion of this person-enterprise problem under RICO
can easily slip into a metaphysical or ontological style of discourse-after
all, when is the person truly an entity 'distinct' or 'separate' from the
enterprise."151 Noting the policy concerns over the potential liability of
"victim" corporations expressed in earlier cases,15 2 the court surmised
that section 1962(c)'s language was part of a congressional plan in this
regard. Judge Cudahy reasoned that to appreciate this plan, one had to
read the language of section 1962(c) against the backdrop of section
1962(a). Section 1962(a), the court maintained, "makes the corporation-
enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct
146 "To be sure, the analogy between individuals and fictive persons such as corporations is not
exact. Still we would not take seriously, in the absence of very explicit statutory language, an asser-
tion that a defendant could conspire with his right arm, which held, aimed and fired the fatal
weapon." Id at 1190.
Commentators have also drawn an analogy between § 1962(c)'s requirement of employment or
association and conspiracy law's requirement of agreement. Accordingly, because an individual may
not conpsire with himself, he may not be employed by or associated with himself. See, e.g, Tarlow,
RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 202 n.194 (1980) (citing
United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); Poller v.
C.B.S., Inc., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962)).
Although this conclusion obtains for individuals under conspiracy rules, it may not obtain for corpo-
rations. Therefore, it is necessary to continue the analogy into the corporate context rather than
simply apply the conclusion reached for individuals to corporations.
Corporate conspiracy, like all other corporate action, is a function of the actions of agents and
employees. Thus, corporate liability may not be predicated on a theory that a single employee con-
spired with himself, but may be found if an employee conspires with another individual, including
another-employee. In the latter instance, therefore, a corporation may be said to "conspire with
itself" through an intracorporate conspiracy between two employees. See generally K. BRICKEY, supra note
62, § 6:21. Such conspiracies are recognized under the general federal conspiracy statute. Id.; see
supra note 57 for full text of statute. Policy has dictated a different conclusion in antitrust law. K.
BRICKEY, supra, § 6:20; See infra note 191.
Thus, the Computer Sciences reasoning well illustrates the need for appreciation of the distinction
between individual and corporate action. What the court labelled "[ilnexact" appears to be flatout
incorrect both literally and figuratively. The conduct of a human arm is not difficult to attribute to its
human owner. RICO, like most other statutes proscribing criminal activity, states the conditions for
such attribution. See supra note 2. Whether such conduct may be attributed to the owner's corporate
employer is a separate question. RICO, like most other statutes proscribing criminal activity, does
not state the conditions for this kind of attribution. General principles of corporate liability, how-
ever, do answer this second question. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The Computer
Sciences reasoning reflects neither application of these principles nor policy for their rejection.
147 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
148 Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984).
149 The Ninth Circuit's consideration of the issue is particularly noteworthy for its lack of in-
dependent analysis: "If Union Bank is the enterprise, it cannot also be the RICO defendant. See
United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation [citation numbers omitted]. Thus, Rae can state no
RICO cause of action against Union Bank itself." Id. at 481.
150 747 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1984).
151 Id. at 401.
152 Id. at 400.
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or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not
when it is merely the victim, prize, or passive instrument of racketeer-
ing."'1 53 The Haroco reasoning seems to imply that Congress intended to
exclude the application of traditional criminal entity liability principles by
incorporating them into the text of the statute. Even though the court
cited no legislative history to support its interpretation, Haroco, like Com-
puter Sciences, gained uncritical acclaim in the courts of appeal.1 54
B. Diference from Similarity
The notion that the statutory language precludes enterprise liability
under section 1962(c) is questionable on its face. Although "self-associ-
ated" is not vernacular, "self-employed" is hardly archaic.155 Notably,
courts have permitted sole proprietorships to fill both the "enterprise"
and "person" roles.' 5 6 Moreover, what legislative history there is sug-
153 Id. at 402 (citing Blakey, supra note 13, with approval). See Blakey, id. at 308-323 for discus-
sion of "perpetrator," "instrument," "victim," and "prize".
154 See, e.g., Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
("[W]e find ourselves in agreement with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit... we adopt it and
need not repeat it here.").
155 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 581 n.235 (citing IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICMONARY
31 (Supp. 1985)).
156 McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985) (sole proprietorship can be both "person"
and "enterprise" under § 1962(c), so long as not "strictly a one man band"). Accord United States v.
Benny, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986).
How the reasoning of McCullough and Benny can coexist in the same circuits as Haroco and Rae is
difficult to comprehend. Cf United States v. Yonan, 622 F. Supp. 721, 722-23 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(ShadurJ.) ("Judge Posner's [McCullough] opinion does not (of course) acknowledge just how much
it bends RICO out of shape .... ). Judge Posner related McCullough and Haroco in this way:
There would be a problem if the sole proprietorship were strictly a one-man show. If
Suter had no employees or other associates and simply did business under the name of the
National Investment Publishing Company, it could hardly be said that he was associating
with an enterprise called the National Investment Publishing Company; you cannot associ-
ate with yourself, any more than you conspire with yourself, just by giving yourself a non de
guerre. We therefore held in Haroco ... [citation omitted], that an enterprise.., could not
associate with itself for purposes of section 1962(c). But Suter had several people working
for him; this made his company an enterprise, and not just a one-man band; and all section
1962(c) requires, as we said in Haroco, is "some separate and distinct existence for the per-
son [Suter] and the enterprise [National Investment Publishing Company]." (citation
omitted).
757 F.2d at 144.
The impropriety of the analogy between individual and intracorporate conspiracy has already
been noted. See supra note 146. As the court in Benny observed, "[c]oncededly, the [Haroco] distinc-
tion wears thin when one considers that a sole shareholder of a corporation would, under the lan-
guage of the statute, be able to 'associate with that corporation.'" 786 F.2d at 1416. Appearing to
further erode the Haroco distinction, Judge Posner continued:
It is true that if Suter were all by himself, and yet adopted the corporate form for his
activity, he might well fall under section 1962(c), for the corporation would be an enterprise
within the meaning of section 1961(4). And from this it could be argued that since subsec-
tion 4 defines enterprise so broadly, even a sole proprietorship is an enterprise and Suter is
therefore caught by section 1962(c)- thus showing the absurdity of ever treating a sole
proprietorship as an enterprise. But these cases are different. If the one-man band incor-
porates, it gets some legal protections from the corporate form, such as limited liability; and
it is just this sort of legal shield for illegal activity that RICO tries to pierce. A one-man
band that does not incorporate, that merely operates as a proprietorship, gains no legal
protections from the form in which it has chosen to do business; the man and the proprie-
torship really are the same entity in law and in fact. But if the man has employees or associ-
ates, the enterprise is distinct from him, and it then makes no difference, so far as we can
see, what legal form the enterprise takes. The only important thing is that it be either
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gests that the "as a principal" in language in section 1962(a) was added
simply to "clarify Congress' intent to limit that subsection to active par-
ticipants, excluding mere recipients of funds."'157 In its present form,
every subsection of section 1962, including section 1962(c), requires af-
firmative conduct by the "person." 158 Without its "as a principal" lan-
guage, subsection (a) might threaten to hold a completely "victim"
entity liable. 159 In short, contrary to the Haroco hypothesis, it appears
section 1962(a) was changed to make it more lik section 1962(c). Never-
theless, decisions continue to depend upon the allegedly "crystal
clear" 60 difference in statutory language. Constrained by its earlier de-
cision in Haroco, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in LiquidAir
reasoned that whether vicarious liability lies under section 1962(b)
turned on "whether the language of subsection (b) is more like (a) or
(C).'1 6 1
C. Innocence by Association
Although the person-enterprise protects victims, it also protects per-
petrators. As such the rule is both dangerous and superfluous. Criminal
agency principles distinguish victims from perpetrators, 62 but the per-
son-enterprise rule precludes their application. Moreover, the general
formally (as when there is incorporation) or practically (as when there are other people
besides the proprietor working in the organization) separable from the individual.
757 F.2d at 144.
The above reasoning appears virtually indistinguishable from that of the Hartley opinion. See
supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
157 Judicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 596 (citing United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 1623, S.
1816, S. 2022, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Committee on
theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 404-406 (1969); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 317-
18) (1983).
158 See full text of § 1962 quoted supra note 2.
159 See full text of § 1962(a) quoted supra note 2..
160 "If Congress had meant to permit the same entity to be the liable person and the enterprise
under section 1962(c), it would have required only a simple change in language to make that inten-
tion crystal clear." Haroco, 747 F.2d at 400.
161 Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987).
162 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The desire to protect victim enterprises "hardly
seems a reason to fashion a general rule that applies even when the enterprise is not the victim, but is
instead the perpetrator." AD Hoc C VIL RICO TASK FORCE, A.B.A. SEC. OF CORPORATION, BANKING
AND BusINESs LAW 374 n.607 (1985) (emphasis in original).
(S]uppose the Board of Directors of a corporation commits multiple mail frauds in its oper-
ation of the company. Surely each participating member of the Board faces possible RICO
liability. The only policy reason not to hold the company liable as well is to protect corpo-
rate assets owned by innocent shareholders. But this interest may well be outweighed by
(1) the preference of allocating risk of loss to persons who have exercised some choice in
corporate governance or who can otherwise potentially exercise some control over corpo-
rate affairs; (2) the desire to encourage private enforcement actions when a legitimate en-
terprise is being turned to corruption; (3) the need to encourage shareholders to insist
upon internal audit procedures to protect against such corporate activities; (4) the aim of
ensuring full compensation of losses suffered by victims; (5) the availability of actions on
behalf of the corporation or shareholders against Board members; and (6) the appropriate-
ness of holding the corporate entity liable as a separate person just as many of the advan-
tages of "personhood" inure to its benefit. Accordingly, under circumstances like these,
the policies underlying RICO would appear to argue in favor of an "enterprise" which is
also a "person" pursuing its affairs through racketeering activities.
Id. at 374-376.
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jurisprudence of the federal criminal law protects victims from criminal
liability, 163 and would therefore protect victims from RICO liability re-
gardless of the civil or criminal character of the remedy or penalty sought
for the unlawful conduct. Apparently panicked by the prospect of guilt
by (employment or) association, however, the courts have fashioned an
equally disturbing rule of innocence by association.
1. Corporations qua Corporations
The immunity from section 1962(c) liability that the person-enter-
prise rule confers upon corporations was well illustrated in Schofield v.
First Commodity Corp. of Boston ("FCCB"). 164 In Schofield, the defendants
allegedly fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to invest all of their liquid
assets into commodity futures. The complaint asserted that the defend-
ant corporation was liable either directly or vicariously. 165 The plaintiffs
163 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, § 6.8 at 595 (victims are excepted from accomplice
liability).
164 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
165 Id. at 29. Part III of this note suggested the potential for confusion created by drawing dis-
tinctions between "direct" and "vicarious" forms of corporate liability akin to those drawn in indi-
vidual liability contexts. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. In Schofield, this potential was
realized.
The Schofield court citedJudicial Efforts (supra note 23), in support of its ban on "vicarious" liabil-
ity under § 1962(c). Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33 and 34 n.4. The word "vicarious" apparently did not
mean the same thing to the court and to the commentator, however. Schofield apparently used the
terms in their literal sense. Thus, as noted earlier, if the plaintiffs name the corporation as the
"person," the liability sought is said to be "direct." If the plaintiffs name the employee as the "per-
son," the liability sought is said to be "vicarious."
Unlike Schofield, Judicial Efforts apparently used the terms "direct" and "vicarious" to connote a
substantive difference between "corporate statutory liability" for crimes and "common-law vicarious
liabilty" for torts. See Judicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 564, 606 (appearing to use the terms "corpo-
rate statutory" and "common law vicarious" interchangeably with "direct" and "vicarious," respec-
tively). Ironically, Judicial Efforts also advocated abandonment of the person-enterprise rule. Id. at
605 ("The distinct person and enterprise requirement should also be rejected.")
The use of the "direct" and "vicarious" terminology seems to cloud any underlying distinction
sought to be drawn between civil and criminal doctrines. Both "corporate statutory" and "common-
law vicarious" liability share common origins in the doctrine of respondeat superior. K. BRICKEY,
supra note 62, at 217. The terminology also distorts the idea that a corporation may be "directly"
liable even though there is no individual guilt of the employee or agent to "vicariously" impute to it.
SeeJudicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 601 ("A theory of vicarious liability imputes the employees' guilt or
innocence to the corporation. Direct corporate liability does not depend upon the guilt or innocence
of the employees.") (Emphasis added). While corporate liability does not depend upon the legal
guilt or innocence of employees or agents, it nevertheless does depend upon the actions of employ-
ees or agents. Labelling such liability "direct," therefore, seems inappropriate.
A similar fate appeared to befall Professor Blakey's "person-instrument- prize-victim" terminol-
ogy in Haroco. Where Schofield misconstrued an attempted substantive distinction in justifying its ban
on vicarious liability, Haroco misused an attempted literal description in rationalizing its person-
enterprise rule under § 1962(c). That an enterprise may be a "victim," "instrument," "perpetra-
tor," "prize," "conduit," "tool," "front," is all very well. Like the word "vicarious," however, the
words only describe possible roles; they do not define legal standards to determine who may prop-
erly play which roles. Accord Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18 at 581 n.235 ("The approach reflects
little more than basic linguistic theory.") (citing G. DILLON, INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY LIN-
GUISTIC SEMANTICS 68-82 (1977)); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 147 (1978) ("That liabil-
ity is 'vicarious' simply expresses the conclusion that the defendant will be held liable for the acts of
another. It is not a rationale for holding the defendant liable.").
Fundamentally, the substantive law is concerned with only two types of enterprises: those which
may be held liable, and those which may not be. Criminal respondeat superior and agency principles
draw the line between the two. The person-enterprise rule does not. Nor do labels like perpetrator
and victim or direct and vicarious.
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alleged the FCCB's account representatives were the "persons," and that
FCCB itself was the "enterprise."1 66 The plaintiffs also argued that the
corporation should be liable if the FCCB representatives' actions re-
flected corporate policy.167 Rejecting "direct" liability under these alle-
gations, the court stated "it is only by straining the language that we
could read Section 1962(c) as imposing liability on even a culpable enter-
prise as well as the person."' 68 The court viewed respondeat superior as
a method "to accomplish indirectly what the statute directly denies,"' 69
and upheld the dismissal of the section 1962(c) claims. 170 Recognizing
the Haroco distinction between section 1962(c) and section 1962(a), how-
ever, the court stated "[b]ecause a narrow reading of section 1962(a)...
would insulate much criminal activity, and because the language permits
a broader reading, that section must be read to allow corporations to
serve both as the RICO person and as the RICO enterprise."' 7'1
Yet, as noted earlier, the language of section 1962(c) also "permits a
broader reading."1 72 Moreover, a narrow reading of section 1962(c) also
"insulates much criminal activity." If the racketeering activity produces a
nonmonetary or untraceable benefit- or no benefit at all- section
1962(a) does not apply.' 73 Such activity by an entity is covered by sec-
166 Schofield, 793 F.2d at 30.
167 Id,
168 Id.
169 IL. at 33.
170 ld, at 33-34.
171 Id. at 32.
172 See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
173 See full text of § 1962(a) quoted supra note 2. Disturbingly,the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit in Liquid Air appeared to advance a requirement that the entity actually benefit from the
racketeering before it may be subject to vicarious RICO liability. 834 F.2d at 1307 ("Respondeat
superior is therefore entirely appropriate under both subsections (a) and (b), so long as Bridges
Welding derived a benefit from the violations."). Inasmuch as an actual benefit is inherent whenever
an entity invests the proceeds of racketeering in itself, it is true that § 1962(a) "requires" an actual
benefit to the violator. However, "racketeering activity" includes a host of non-income-producing
methods by which to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise in violation of § 1962(b). See
supra note 19 ("racketeering activity" includes murder, kidnapping, arson, etc.).
That a person must actually benefit from a violation of law in order to be held liable for the
violation seems bizarre as a general proposition. See Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d
905, 908 (4th Cir.) ("[B]enefit, at best is an evidential, not an operative fact"), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945). It is directly at odds with civil RICO, which focuses upon the injuries to business or
property sustained by victims of racketeering, not the benefits derived by perpetrators. See supra
notes 10-13, 89 and accompanying text. Entity criminal liability is premised upon violations commit-
ted by employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment or authority and with the
intention of benefiting their employers or principals. See supra note 62. Accordingly, the proper
approach to determine an entity's liability under RICO is to focus on whether the employees or
agents in question intended to benefit their corporate employer or principal, not whether they actu-
ally did so. Cf Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987)
(quoted infra note 185) (attempt to benefit determinative).
Furthermore, the ability to sue under § 1962(a) at all may be limited in some jurisdictions by a
rule of narrow construction other than the person-enterprise rule. Some courts have held that the
injury required in order to sue for a § 1962(a) violation must flow specifically from the "investment
or use" of the proceeds of racketeering activity, rather than the racketeering activity itself. See Gil-
bert v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Heritage.Ins. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. Ill. 1986). But see Louisiana Power and Light
Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 805-07 (E.D. La. 1986). When combined with
the person-enterprise rule under § 1962(c), the effect of this "investment rule" under § 1962(a) may
be to insulate entities from RICO liability altogether. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 585
n.237.
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tion 1962(c), yet the person-enterprise rule effectively confers immunity
upon entities when they violate this section by conducting their own af-
fairs through a pattern of racketeering.174 As a result, plaintiffs injured
by "non-profit" criminality are left without RICO's remedies, and enti-
ties engaged in such racketeering175 are left outside RICO's purview.
This result appears contrary to both the statute's liberal construction
clause, 176 and its express provision for the dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise.177
2. Corporations in Associations in Fact
In Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of North America, 178 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a count alleging the vicari-
ous liability of the defendant corporation and naming the corporation as
the "enterprise" under section 1962(c).179 Significantly, in light of its
earlier decision in B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 180 the court allowed
to stand a similar derivative liability count under section 1962(c) which
named the corporation as part of an association in fact consisting of the
defendant corporation and some of its employees.' 8 ' The ability to
plead around the person-enterprise rule in this fashion has been cited as
indicative of the weakness of the rule.'8 2 Earlier cases in the Third Cir-
cuit appeared to leave open this possibility, but implied that the plaintiff
might still have to establish that the association in fact had an organiza-
tional structure identifiably separate from that of the corporation it-
self.'8 3 Without this or a similar requirement, it is difficult to see how
Petro-Tech does not allow "corporate liability in fact" under section
174 See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 32 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986).
175 The classic example of such an enterprise may be a corrupt union. See, e.g., United States v.
Local 560 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
176 See supra note 13.
177 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1).
178 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987).
179 Id. at 1359-60.
180 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984).
181 824 F.2d at 1361-62.
182 Adams, Enterprise Liability Under § 1962(c), [1985] RICO L. Rep. 136-37 (RLR).
183 In United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983), the
Third Circuit enumerated three prerequisites for an enterprise: (1) an ongoing organization (2) a
functioning of the associates as a continuing unit and (3) an existence of the enterprise separate and
apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages. 709 F.2d at 221-23 (citing
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). Eighth circuit decisions originated these requirements. See United States
v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir. 1982) (enterprise must have "some structure separate from
the racketeering activity and distinct from the organization which is a necessary incident to the racke-
teering."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); see also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372
(8th Cir. 1980) (association in fact must have "an ascertainable structure which exists for the pur-
pose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be
defined apart from the pattern of racketeering activity.").
A corporation would appear to fulfill such requirements automatically via incorporation.
Whether an association in fact comprised of a corporation and its employees would need to have an
organizational structure separate and apart from that of the corporation (in addition to being sepa-
rate and apart from the pattern of racketeering) remains uncertain after Petro-Tech. See Seville Indus.
Mach. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-54 (D.N.J. 1983) (noting distinct "per-
son.".enterprise" issue but declining to reach the question), modified, 742 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir.
1984) (also noting distinct "person."'enterprise" issue but declining to reach the question), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
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1962(c), contrary to the rule in Enright. As such, it is not clear whether
Petro-Tech pays Enright homage or lip service.
That Congress intended a single corporation to be described as an
association in fact comprised of itself and its employees seems doubtful
in light of the fact that the statutory definition of "enterprise" already
includes a corporation. 84 The differences between an association in fact
and a corporation were noted in Part 111.185 Arguably, the reason RICO
includes a corporation, but not an association in fact, in its definition of
"person" is to avoid precisely the result of the person-enterprise rule:
immunizing corporations from liability for conducting their own affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 186 Strangely however, it ap-
pears that if a corporation may be a member "person" of an association
in fact "enterprise" comprised of itself and its employees, the person-
enterprise rule is circumvented- and the corporation may then be liable
under the same respondeat superior principles that it would have been
liable under had it originally been named as both the "person" and the
"enterprise." 187
184 See statutory definition of "enterprise" quoted supra note 17.
185 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
186 As noted earlier, the notion that an association may not legally hold property in a way distinct
from the personal holdings of its members underpins the reasoning of the person enterprise rule.
See supra note 75. Presumed incapable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, associa-
tions therefore do not qualify as "persons" under RICO. In this way, a distinction between member-
persons and association-enterprises is inherent in situations where the enterprise is an association in
fact. Thus, the person-enterprise rule does not apply in such situations. As noted earlier, however,
there may be a problem when one of the members of an association in fact is a legally recognized
artificial entity. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
In fact, associations may be able to hold property in a way that is distinct from the personal
holdings of its members. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (dis-
cussing forfeiture under RICO): "[TMhe... natural interpretation is that an 'interest' [in the RICO
enterprise]' is akin to a continuing proprietary right in the nature of a partnership or stock owner-
ship." If this is the case, then associations in fact are "persons," entities capable of holding a benefi-
cial interest in property, as well as "enterprises." A consistent application of the person-enterprise
rule would therefore appear to require that the rule be applied to situations where the alleged enter-
prise is an association in fact. Such an application of the rule would shield even the traditional
organized crime family (an association in fact) from RICO liability.
In sum, with respect to associations in fact, the person-enterprise rule is unprincipled in both its
reasoning and application. Even if its underlying assumptions about the nature of association prop-
erty are correct, the rule is inconsistently applied. However, a consistent application of the rule
would remove even stereotypical organized crime from RICO's purview. The rule should therefore
be rejected as directly contrary to the statute.
187 Cf Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987):
The enterprise in Count IV is alleged to be an association in fact consisting of Western
[the corporation] and the individual defendants [Western employees]. Because Western is
alleged to have attempted to benefit from its employees' racketeering activity, it is appropri-
ate to allow the victims of that activity to recover from Western. Moreover, although Count
IV is brought against Western under § 1962(c), theories of respondeat superior and aiding
and abetting liability are not out of place here because under Count IV Western is not
alleged to be an enterprise. Holding Western liable under those theories is therefore not
inconsistent with the Enright rule that § 1962(c) enterprises may not be held liable.
While Pelro-Tech's recognition of such theories of liability under RICO is admirable, the reason-
ing by which the court arrived at this result is nevertheless subject to criticism. Although the court
acknowledged that "[t]he doctrine of aiding and abetting is simply one way that an individual can
violate the substantive criminal laws," 824 F.2d at 1357, the cour-t seemed unaware that RICO, a
substantive criminal law itself, is codified as part of the federal criminal code. As such, 18 U.S.C. § 2
is the proper point of departure for analyzing aiding and abetting questions under RICO, and not
merely an illustrative example of the doctrine of aiding and abetting in action. Further evidencing
the court's loosely reasoned analysis, the court observed that some courts have recognized aiding
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The spectre of this new "incorporated association in fact," raised as
a direct result of the person-enterprise rule, has apparently caused the
American Bar Association's RICO Coordinating Committee to propose
amending section 1962(c) to require that the " 'person'. .. not be a part
of an affiliated group whose membership also includes the "enter-
prise." 188 While this amendment accomplishes the person-enterprise
rule immunity for associations in fact which are really corporations, it
also immunizes those associations in fact which are, in fact, associations
in fact. Thus, where some courts apparently treat both person-enterprise
rule immunized corporations and non-immunized associations in fact as
associations in fact, the proposed amendment would treat both corpora-
tions and associations in fact like corporations immunized by the person-
enterprise rule. The result would be to make make even the classic or-
ganized crime family immune from section 1962(c) liability.189 Interest-
ingly, given Computer Sciences and progeny, this very result appears
imminent in the Fourth Circuit even without such an amendment to
RICO. 190
3. Intracorporate Conspiracies
Relying principally on antitrust intracorporate conspiracy cases, dis-
trict courts have precluded similar actions under section 1962(d) as at-
tempts to circumvent the person enterprise rule.' 9 1 In Landmark Savings
and abetting liability under the federal securities laws. In an apparent attempt to underscore the
openness of the aiding and abetting question under RICO, the court then proceeded to note that
Petro-Tech was "not a securities case. ... Id. The fact that Petro-Tech was not a securities case,
however, should have provided the court with even more reason to apply 18 U.S.C. § 2. RICO,
unlike the federal securities laws, is codified along wjith the federal aiding and abetting statute as part
of Title 18. See supra note 85. Notably, the Schofield court committed a similar analytical error. See
Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33 ("The present case is unlike A.S.M.E. [an antitrust case] or Atlantic Financial
Management [a securities case].").
188 AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION, RICO COORDINATING COMMITTEE REPORT 1-2 (1987).
189 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 583.
190 "We conclude 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being different from, not the same as or part
of, the person whose behavior the act was designated to prohibit .... United States v. Computer
Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) [emphasis added]; Entre Computer'Centers, Inc. v.
FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d 1279, 1287 (4th Cir. 1987).
191 The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine traces its roots to Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Mo-
torola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). In Nelson, the court
declared it is "the basic law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a
conspiracy.... A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and
it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation." Id. at 914. More
recently, in Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 769 (1984), the Supreme Court
reasoned that because "agreements among [officers of the same corporation] do not suddenly bring
together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals," intracorporate conspiracies
are outside the scope of Section I of the Sherman Act. Id.
In relevant part, Section I of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section 2 also prohibits conspiracy. In relevant part, that section provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
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and Loan v. Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 192 the court held that a cause of
action under section 1962(d) does not exist for conspiracies between a
corporation and its einployees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.193 The Landmark decision has become the prevailing view.19 4
Unlike the antitrust laws, however, RICO is not solely concerned
with concerted action by distinct economic entities; 95 RICO is con-
cerned with eliminating sophisticated forms of crime.' 96 A rule that
shields intracorporate conspiracies from the statute seriously impairs
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Unlike § 2, § 1 reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effectuated only by a
"contract, combination.., or conspiracy," that is, concerted action by two or more distinct entities.
See Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 1155, 1158 (1982).
"[A]ithough it may be characterized as 'basic' that conspiracy requires two persons in the sense of
two minds, it is not basic to all forms of conspiracy that two entities or two persons, in the sense of
two business associations, be involved. Id. at 1162. See also supra note 146. Notably, Copperweld's
decision that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were "incapable of conspiring
with each other for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act," 467 U.S. at 777, was not based on
any intracorporate conpiracy doctrine. Commenting on the doctrine, the court stated:
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and
ignores the reality. Antitrust liability should depend not on whether a corporate subunit is
organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary.
Id. at 772. See also Welling, supra at 1163 ("A more pertinent question is whether the corporation
can be held as a conspirator for the acts of more than one of its agents.").
Rather than relying on an intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the Court based its decision on
the purposes of the Sherman Act:
The officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate eco-
nomic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic
power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Coordination within a firm is as likely
to result from an effort to compete as an effort to stifle competition. In the marketplace,
such coordination may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively.
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769. A similar analysis of the purposes behind RICO, however, would yield a
different result. It is precisely because of the "reality" of organizations, namely that they can act
only through their agents, that intracorporate conspiracies to commit unlawful acts should be recog-
nized. Nevertheless, courts have extended the scope of Copperweld beyond the antitrust area and
barred RICO intracorporate conspiracy claims. See Fabrico Mfg. Corp. v. Wilson Sporting Goods
Co., No. 85 C 71 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1985) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3413). The application of
Copperweld to RICO was, however, properly rejected in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 403 n.22 (7th Cir. 1984), afd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
Courts have also applied an anti-intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in civil rights cases. In
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), the court stated that "the fact that two or
more agents participated in the decision or in the act itself will not normally constitute the conspir-
acy contemplated by [42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982)1." Although Dombrowski is the majority rule, see
Welling, supra, at 1169, many courts have made exceptions, or abandoned it altogether. See Strathos
v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (Dombrowski not followed); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav.
and Loan Ass'n., 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979) (Dombrowski not followed); Aungst v. J. C. Penney Co., 456 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(appearing to recognize an exception for continuing instances of discrimination); Beamon v. W.B.
Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (recognizing an exception when individu-
als represent distinct 8 decision-making units within corporation); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F.
Supp. 992, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (recognizing an exception for continuing instances of discrimina-
tion); See generally Welling, supra, at 1171 & nn.83-89. Professor Welling labelled the Dombrowski
rule a "manifestation of the court's desire to limit section 1985(3) [that] is not based on require-
ments of conspiracy law, but instead reflects a concern related exclusively to section 1985(3)." Wel-
ling, supra, at 1173. It appears a similar evaluation could be made of many courts' interpretation of
RICO § 1962(d).
192 572 F. Supp. 206 (1981).
193 Id. at 209.
194 See cases cited supra note 122.
195 Compare the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, supra note 2, with the language of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2,
supra note 191.
196 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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RICO's effectiveness for this purpose. Recognizing this problem, some
courts have rejected the intracorporate conspiracy prohibition.197
D. Expansion by Limitation
In a final irony, the person-enterprise rule threatens to encourage a
"flood" of claims premised on the civil standard of entity liability. 198
Courts, preoccupied with the "metaphysical or ontological" question of
person-enterprise distinctness, have generally failed to clarify how a cor-
poration may be held liable under RICO. In American Society of Mechanical
Engineers v. Hydrolevel, 199 the Supreme Court acknowledged that absent
clear congressional indication to the contrary, the normal rules of agency
apply to a federal statute.200
Much of the ASME opinion may go too far for RICO purposes, how-
ever. If the civil rules applied, a corporation could be liable under an
apparent authority theory without the requirement that the employee in-
tended to benefit the corporation. 20 ' Unlike the antitrust laws, RICO is
codified as part of the criminal code. 20 2 As such the normal rules of
agency that should apply would appear to be those of the criminal, not
the civil, law. 20 3
VI. An Alternative Approach 20 4
There is a need for a clear articulation of the standards of entity
liability under RICO. To date, the courts have not only developed their
own indiscriminate interpretation of RICO, but inspired others to do the
197 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Development Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 6746 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,
1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 6862); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. 111. 1986);
Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Saine v. AIA, 582 F. Supp. 1299
(D. Colo. 1984); Mauriber v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
198 See Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984). But see Louisiana Power & Light
v. United Gas Pipe Line, 642 F. Supp. 781, 803-804 (E.D. La. 1986) (state of mind of employee is
state of mind of corporation); Laterza v. A.B.C. Co., Inc. 581 F. Supp. 408,412-413 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
199 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
200 Id. at 569. At least one commentator has seized upon the ASME holding to argue for the
application of civil agency principles to civil RICO cases. Starr, Application of the General Principles of
Agency Law, Including the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, in a Civil Action Under RICO, ALI-ABA RE-
SOURCE MATERIALS, CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS (4th ed.), in
RICO LAw DEVELOPMENTS: 1987 91-112 (1987).
201 See supra note 48.
202 See supra note 85 (discussing difference between code titles which have and have not been
enacted into positive law).
203 See United States v. Local 560 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 322 n.30, 337 (D.
NJ.) (rules for aiding and abetting liability are those of the criminal, not the civil law despite civil
character of case), aft'd, 780 F.2d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
204 Concededly, given the weight of authority, asserting that the "person" need not be distinct
from the "enterprise" may be like arguing that anyone other than Columbus discovered America.
Nevertheless, some courts appear to be moving away from the person-enterprise rule without
acknowledging it directly. In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
639, Nos. 86-5135, 86-5316 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1791), for
example, the court recognized the person-enterprise rule but also noted that under the rule
requiring distinct entities, "however, § 1962(c) liability usually cannot be imposed on those
organizations created solely for illegal purposes and operated to the detriment of third parties by
corrupt directors or controlling partners." Id., slip. op. at 14. The court went on to describe Hartley
as "an exception to the non-identity rule [i.e., the person-enterprise rule,] ... for the institution that
functions as both 'perpetrator' and 'victim'." Id. Hartley, it seems, should not be the exception but
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same. Defining the appropriate criteria involves avoiding two equally un-
desirable outcomes. On the one hand, complete denial of the existence
rather the rule. Traditional criminal entity liability standards are already capable of distinguishing
"perpetrators" from "victims" without the help of the person-enterprise rule.
Perhaps the most encouraging opinion is the Third Circuit's Petro-Tech. There, the court
seemed to recognize the possible existence of an association in fact comprised only of a corporation
and its employees. While the exact consequences of this recognition remain uncertain, see supra
notes 177-187 and accompanying text, the court conceded that any liability the corporation might
incur would be based on theories of respondeat superior. See supra note 187.
By contrast, in D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, No. 86-3140 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 1987) (LEXIS,
1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1535), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ostensibly denied the
existence of respondeat superior liability under RICO. However, the court's holding appeared to
rest upon its finding that the employee in question acted without the intent to benefit his corporate
principal. Disturbingly, the court drew a distinction between "direct" and "vicarious" corporate
liability in denying respondeat superior under RICO. As noted earlier, all corporate liability is
necessarily vicarious. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. Furthermore, corporate
criminal liability traces its origin to the doctrine of respondeat superior. See supra notes 62, 81.
In Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331 (D.
P.R. 1987), the court held that respondeat superior applied to RICO. Interestingly, the court started
its analysis from section 1964(c), rather than from section 1962(c). "Certainly," the court stated,
"Section 1964(c) does not on its face restrict the possible range of defendants so as to exclude
persons vicariously liable." Id at 1341. The court noted the liberal reading of RICO's treble
damages provision made by the Supreme Court in Sedima and also the "broad purpose" of the
statute noted by the court in Turkette. Additionally, as the Bernstein court had done, the FSLIC court
found ASME's reasoning applicable to RICO actions.
Distinguishing Schofield, the Puerto Rico district court stated "the [Schofield] court did not reject
the appplicability of respondeat superior to .. . subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 [other than
§ 1962(c)], and did not consider situations where the victimized enterprise was the plaintiff in the
case. Id. at 1342. Commenting on the case before it, the FSLIC court noted, "According to the
pleadings, the infiltration of Home Federal, a legitimate business, was accomplished under the cloak
and status of defendant['s] ... high position as a Shearson ... employee and officer.., it would be
inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Act not to permit Home Federal a § 1962(c) claim
against its infiltration in these circumstances. Id
Because the enterprise was the plaintiff in the case, Judge Acosta in FSLIC did not need to
consider the person-enterprise rule. Nevertheless, the court's recognition of vicarious corporate
liabilty under § 1962(c) despite Schofield seems significant. RICO does not contain any qualification
that the plaintiff be an enterprise any person injured in business or property as a result of a violation
of§ 1962(c) may sue. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. If vicarious corporate liability exists
when the injured plaintiff is an enterprise: it ought also exist when the injured plaintiff is a person
though not the enterprise. That is, after all, what the statute suggests. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1982).
The seemingly endless potential for bizarre results created by the person-enterprise rule,
coupled with the apparently baseless justifications for the rule itself, should argue strongly for the
rule's reconsideration. Some have proposed applying the superior agent rule, discussed supra note
62, to RICO. See Lacovara and Nicoli, Refocusing the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act"
on "Corrupt Organizations," 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) at I (May 5, 1987). Early RICO cases appeared
to leave open the possibility of corporate liability under § 1962(c), despite a person-enterprise
identity, for the acts of high managerial agents. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, 548 F.
Supp. 20, 23-24 & n.9 (N.D. I11. 1982) ("[The plaintiffs) have tried to reshape a conventional
(alleged) fraud, perpetrated by lower-level corporate executives acting without corporate sanction
(albeit conducting themselves within the scope of their authority for common-law purposes), into a
§ 1962(c) RICO violation by the corporation."). See generally Starr, supra note 200, at 91-112.
("Alternatively, some of the cases may perhaps be read, not as precluding the application of
respondeat superior but rather as precluding only the pristine form of the doctrine.") Later cases,
however, appear to foreclose even this possibility where the corporation is both "person" and
"enterprise." See, e.g., Schofield, at 32 n.3 ("We think even a conditional approach to respondeat
superior is inconsistent with our prior conclusion on direct liability [under § 1962(c)] and so we
choose not to adopt it."). Notably, however, the superior agent rule is the general rule of entity
liability in some jurisdictions that have adopted "little RICO" statutes. It must therefore be applied
to such state law claims. Compare, supra note 62, with COLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101-109 (1986); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401-14 (1988). Moreover, for the situation where the entity is the defendant
"person" though not an "enterprise," at least one federal district court has recognized the potential
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of corporations that conduct their own affairs through racketeering
reduces the statute's effectiveness toward "providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime."'20 5 On the other hand, it would be a perverse result
indeed if RICO, the statute designed to eliminate the influence of organ-
ized crime, were to become the vehicle for allocating the damage done by
racketeering activity as an inevitable cost of doing legitimate business.20 6
Achieving the proper medium between these two extremes requires
understanding two equally complex schemes. On the one hand, there
for liability under the superior agent rule. See Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., Civ. No. B-86-
317 (D. Conn. Dec. 31, 1987) (LEXIS, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806).
The dual nature of statutory treble damages and the remedial purposes of RICO, however,
argue against the wisdom of the additional layer of protection provided for corporations and other
artificial entities by the superior agent rule. More importantly, the superior agent rule simply is not
the general rule in the federal system. See supra note 62. Traditional principles already exclude
entities from liability when employees act solely for their own benefit. They also exclude entities
that are victims of their employees' actions. Those injured by a RICO violation committed for the
benefit of the corporation should be entitled to a RICO remedy regardless of the corporate rank of
the violator.
In addition to any policy reasons which might favor rejection of the superior agent rule under
RICO, however, are more fundamental problems of statutory construction. Applying the superior
agent rule to RICO would result in two different ways to "violate" RICO: a way for civil purposes,
and a way for criminal purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982) ("Whoever violates any provision of
section 1962 of this chapter .. "); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) ("Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter ...."). That such a result should
be avoided is well established. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) ("§ 1963
and § 1964 impose consequences, criminal and civil for 'violations' of § 1962. We should not lightly
infer that Congress intended the term to have wholly different meanings in neighboring
subsections.") (footnote omitted). See also Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401-
402 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting) ("[Wiords cannot be read one way in a suit which is to end in fine
and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction. The construction which is
adopted in this case must be adopted in one of the other sort .... So I say we must read the wordf
before us as if the question were whether two small exporting grocers should go to jail.").
The interpretive problem with applying the superior agent rule to civil RICO cases lies in the
fact that Congress provided that prior criminal RICO convictions shall have preclusive effect in
subsequent civil RICO suits. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982). Given the absence of express language
adopting the superior agent rule, and the fact that scope of employment plus intent to benefit has
been the general rule since the turn of the century, it is highly doubtful that Congress intended the
superior agent rule to govern criminal RICO cases. See supra note 62. Furthermore, if Congress had
intended the superior agent rule to govern civil RICO cases, it seems equally doubtful that Congress
would have provided that a criminal conviction under a less restrictive standard should have
preclusive effect in a subsequent civil case.
Application of traditional criminal corporate liability principles should find favor with friends
and enemies of RICO alike. For not only do such principles expand RICO to accomplish its
remedial objectives, they also limit RICO. Mere apparent authority would not suffice for civil RICO
liability as it does for civil antitrust liability. The conduct of the employee would also have to be
undertaken with the intent to benefit the corporate principal. Where no such intent to benefit could
be found, the corporation would be absolved. See infra note 213. Moreover, where the corporation
is itself a victim of racketeering activity, it, like any other victim, would not be held liable. See supra
note 59. Thus, plaintiffs could rejoice at the relatively uncomplicated, widely-accepted, principled
avenue to recovery from corporations whose employees undertake to benefit their employers
through racketeering. Similarly, traditionally legitimate corporations could revel in the layer of
insulation, albeit not impermeable, provided by the criminal standards of liability. Such standards
appear to border on the Machiavellian for the purpose of limiting civil RICO liability to its proper
bounds due to criminal respondeat superior's relatively uncomplicated, widely-accepted, and
principled rationale. Cf D & S Auto Parts (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1535) ("An employee
violating RICO without his employer's knowledge is highly unlikely to be acting for his employer's
benefit.").
205 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
206 SeeJudicial Efforts, supra note 23, at 606.
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are the common legal distinctions between theories of liability. On the
other hand, there is RICO.
In their attempt to limit corporate liability under RICO to its proper
bounds, courts appear to have sought opportunities to turn the statute's
language against itself rather than to adapt traditional principles of entity
liability to RICO. Thus, because a corporation fits the statutory defini-
tions of both "person" and "enterprise," courts have pondered whether
the same corporation may be both a "person" and an "enterprise" at the
same time. Their answer to this question appears to be "sometimes,"
i.e., "under some subsections." Which subsections vary with the jurisdic-
tion. 20 7 With respect to subsection 1962(c), however, the answer is more
uniform. Under that subsection, not only must there be a "person" and
an "enterprise," but there must be an employment or associative rela-
tionship between the two. As a result courts have also posited the ques-
tion whether a corporation may be "employed by or associated with"
itself. Their answer to this other question appears to be a flat "no." 20 8
In sum, the majority approach has been to contemplate whether certain
person-enterprise relationships may exist in statutory parlance, rather
than to articulate when the actual existence of such relationships may
result in statutory liability.
The proper inquiry is not whether a corporation may be both the
"person" and the "enterprise" at the same time.20 9 When a corporation
is precluded from playing both roles, it cannot violate RICO by investing
in itself or conducting its own affairs through criminal activity. Nor is the
proper question whether a corporation may be employed by or associ-
ated with itself through an employee. A corporation can act only
through its employees and agents. Phrasing the issue in the majority's
terms distorts this reality. The question should be whether, if a person is
"employed by or associated with" the corporation, the corporation may
be liable for that "person's" RICO violation.
Principles of agency and respondeat superior have historically pro-
vided the answer to the question whether a corporation may be liable for
the illegal actions of its employees and agents. Courts appear to recog-
nize, however, a distinction between the way agency and respondeat su-
perior principles have been applied in criminal cases versus civil cases.
In a recent civil antitrust case, for example, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that vicarious civil liability may be imposed upon a corporation
even though the employee may have acted without the intent to benefit
the corporation.210 Courts hearing criminal cases, however, have histori-
cally insisted upon an intent to benefit requirement.2 1'
Generally, the criminal law attributes to the corporation the unlawful
conduct of employees or agents who act within the scope of their em-
207 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 110.
209 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 18, at 582 (" 'In law ... the right answer usually depends on
putting the right question.' ") (quoting Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 420 U.S. 410,413 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J.)).
210 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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ployment or authority and with the intent to benefit the corporation.212
Conversely, actions taken by employees or agents for purely personal
motives are normally considered to be their actions alone.213 When cor-
porations are themselves victims of their employees acts of racketeering,
then an established doctrine of the criminal law excuses the corporation
from liability.2 1 4 The penal component of civil RICO's treble damages
remedy,21 5 and the independently criminal character of the underlying
acts of racketeering RICO requires, 21 6 favor the application of such crim-
inal standards of entity liability to all RICO cases, civil and criminal.
VII. Conclusion
Clearly, RICO prohibits an employee from conducting or participat-
ing in the affairs of his corporate employer through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. 217 Given a violation of the statute by the employee, the
inquiry should focus on whether that violation may be attributed to the
corporation. Established criminal principles provide a response to this
inquiry when employees take advantage of their employer's corporate
form for the purpose of organized criminal activity, and these principles
do so in a manner that honors RICO's aims and avoids harsh results.
Whether liability will be imposed upon a corporation turns on the facts
of the particular case. 218
In fashioning the person-enteprise rule to protect victim corpora-
tions from derivative liability under RICO, the courts have embarked on
a road that they ought not have taken and made a difference they should
regret.21 9 The rule operates to immunize corporations from liability in-
dependent of the facts of a particular case. The rule thus precludes the
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. ofTex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962):
"[W]hile benefit is not essential in terms of result, the purpose to benefit the corpora-
tion is decisive in terms of equating the agent's action with that of the corporation ....
Thus the taking in or paying out of money by a bank teller, while certainly one of his regular
functions, would hardly cast the corporation for criminal liability if in such 'handling' the
faithless employee was pocketing the funds as an embezzler or handing them over to a
confederate under some ruse."
214 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
216 See statutory definition of racketeering activity quoted supra note 19.
217 See full text of § 1962(c) quoted supra note 2. Oddly enough, at least one court has taken the
dubious position that, because corporations can act only through their agents, the agents themselves
are also immune from personal liability when they act within the scope of their employment. See Ellis
v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 664 F. Supp. 979, 982 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
218 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. ofTex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
219 (With apologies to R. Frost, The Road Not Taken.) The premise of this note has been a simple
one: there is a way entity liability issues are normally handled, a way they have been handled under
RICO, and a difference between the two. Common sense demands that courts should not make the
job of the "private prosecutors" that RICO enlists any more difficult than the task of their public
counterparts.
Since its inception in the early 1980s, the person-enterprise rule appears to have made every-
one's task more difficult. It has drawn judicial attention away from considering the substance of a
RICO violation, and toward contemplating a host of bizarre legal concepts. After judges first fore-
closed "directly" naming the same corporation as both the "person" and the "enterprise," plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent the rule by naming the employee as the "person" and the corporation as
the "enterprise" vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Now that many judges
have been forced to foreclose the respondeat superior alternative in order to protect their person-
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consideration of potentially meritorious claims under section 1962(c) in
particular, and confounds the application of entity liability standards
under RICO in general. Existing criminal law principles distinguish the
racketeer influenced from the racketeer victimized. The person-enter-
prise rule does not. Existing criminal law principles operate consistently
with the purposes of RICO. The person-enterprise rule does not. Ac-
cordingly, courts should abandon the person-enterprise rule and apply
established criminal principles of entity liability to RICO cases. 220
Henry A. LaBrun
enterprise rule, plaintiffs have responded, with varying degrees of success, by pleading intracorpo-
rate associations in fact.
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, Nos. 86-5135, 86-
5316 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1791) may foreshadow the next
consequences of the person-enterprise rule. Plaintiffs, following the lead of those in Yellow Bus, may
name themselves as the enterprise in order to get around the person-enterprise rule. Notably, the
definition of enterprise includes individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982); see supra note 17 for full
text.
Some plaintiffs who attempt to follow the Yellow Bus road, however, may run as well into the
Yellow Bus wall. See generally, Cohen, In This Issue, [1988] 7 RICO L. Rep. 394, 395 (RLR). This is
because § 1962(c) requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant conducted or participated
in the affairs of the named "enterprise" (i.e., the plaintiff itself) through a pattern of racketeering
activity. However, the plaintiffs injury may have resulted from only a single act of racketeering,
which, although comprising part of the defendant--"person's" pattern of criminal behavior, argua-
bly might not constitute the necessary "pattern" with respect to the affairs of the plaintiff-"enter-
prise." Indeed, Yellow Bu$ suggests that if such a single act-even though part of a larger pattern-
were to qualify as a pattern with respect to the plaintiff---"enterprise," then § 1962(c)'s "con-
duct.. .through" language would be "reduced to surplusage." Cohen, supra, at 395.
The Yellow Bus wall would not, however, be necessarily insuperable if the "pattern" of acts were
held to include acts directed toward other enterprises or victims, as in Town of Kearny v. Hudson
Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1268 (3d Cir'. 1987) (following Marshall & Ilsley
Trust Co. v. Paye, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987). Even without the person-enterprise rule's
prohibition against defendnt-"enterprises", if courts do not adopt this broader definition of pat-
tern, then § 1962(c) itself would arguably reduced to surplusage as a pattern offense. See Cohen,
supra, at 396.
220 For the most part, this note had discussed federal cases. Obviously, state courts, which have
not yet interpreted the language of similar state legislation ("little RICOs") ought not follow the
misdirection of federal jurisprudence. Unfortunately but understandably, at least one federal court
has looked to the federal RICO cases for "guidance" in interpreting an analagous state racketeering
law. Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (interpreting New Mexico Racketeering Act). As unjustifiable as the rule is for federal RICO,
however, it is arguably more so for state RICOs-especially in those states which have already ex-
pressly adopted the superior agent rule as their general rule of entity criminal liability. See supra note
204.
In addition-to the possibility that state courts might reject the person-enterprise rule in state
RICO cases, there is the hope that Congress will require federal courts to abandon the rule in fed-
eral RICO cases. Legislation has been introduced that would set aside the person-enterprise rule.
See H.R. 3240, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1987); 133 Cong. Rec. E 3361-62 (Aug. 7, 1987) (state-
ment of Rep. Conyers) ("If the [person-enterprise] rule were applied to the association in fact theory
in a prosecution of an organized crime family, it would abort the prosecution.")
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